Beyond Keeping the Peace: Can Peacekeepers Reduce Ethnic Divisions After Violence? by Page, Douglas D. & Whitt, Sam
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science 
8-13-2018 
Beyond Keeping the Peace: Can Peacekeepers Reduce Ethnic 
Divisions After Violence? 
Douglas D. Page 
Gettysburg College 
Sam Whitt 
High Point, USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/poliscifac 
 Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. 
Recommended Citation 
Page, Douglas and Samuel Whitt. "Beyond Keeping the Peace: Can Peacekeepers Reduce Ethnic Divisions 
After Violence?" Political Behavior (2018): 1-26. 
This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository 
by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: 
https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/poliscifac/43 
This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted 
for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact 
cupola@gettysburg.edu. 
Beyond Keeping the Peace: Can Peacekeepers Reduce Ethnic Divisions After 
Violence? 
Abstract 
Existing research suggests that international peacekeeping contributes to conflict resolution and helps 
sustain peace, often in locations with hostile ethnic divisions. However, it is unclear whether the presence 
of peacekeepers actually reduces underlying ethnocentric views and parochial behaviors that sustain 
those divisions. We examine the effects of NATO peacekeeper deployments on ethnocentrism in postwar 
Bosnia. While peacekeepers were not randomly deployed in Bosnia, we find that highly ethnocentric 
attitudes were common across Bosnia at the onset of peacekeeper deployments, reducing endogeneity 
concerns. To measure ethnocentrism, we employ a variety of survey instruments as well as a behavioral 
experiment (the dictator game) with ethnic treatments across time. We find that regions with 
peacekeepers exhibit lower levels of ethnocentrism in comparison to regions without peacekeepers, and 
this effect persists even after peacekeepers have departed. The peacekeeping effect is also robust to a 
sub-sample of ethnic Bosnian Serbs, suggesting that peacekeeper deployments can have positive effects 
on diminishing ethnocentrism, even when local communities are especially hostile to their presence. Our 
results speak to the potential long-term role of peacekeepers in reducing tensions among groups in 
conflict. 
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Abstract 
 
Existing research suggests that international peacekeeping contributes to conflict resolution and 
helps sustain peace, often in locations with hostile ethnic divisions. However, it is unclear 
whether the presence of peacekeepers actually reduces underlying ethnocentric views and 
parochial behaviors that sustain those divisions. We examine the effects of NATO peacekeeper 
deployments on ethnocentrism in postwar Bosnia. While peacekeepers were not randomly 
deployed in Bosnia, we find that highly ethnocentric attitudes were common across Bosnia at the 
onset of peacekeeper deployments, reducing endogeneity concerns. To measure ethnocentrism, 
we employ a variety of survey instruments as well as a behavioral experiment (the dictator game) 
with ethnic treatments across time. We find that regions with peacekeepers exhibit lower levels 
of ethnocentrism in comparison to regions without peacekeepers, and this effect persists even 
after peacekeepers have departed. The peacekeeping effect is also robust to a sub-sample of 
ethnic Bosnian Serbs, suggesting that peacekeeper deployments can have positive effects on 
diminishing ethnocentrism, even when local communities are especially hostile to their presence. 
Our results speak to the potential long-term role of peacekeepers in reducing tensions among 
groups in conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
How can international peacekeepers promote peace in divided societies? We consider 
how peacekeepers might play a positive role in reducing war-time ethnocentric divisions, 
building foundations for long-term positive peace (Galtung 1969). Theoretically, we reason that 
ethnocentrism encourages security dilemmas that can lead to recurrent tensions and conflict 
among groups (Posen 1993). We argue that peacekeepers could reduce ethnocentrism through a 
combination of informational and reputational effects that reduce fears and uncertainty and build 
empathy over time (Kuran 1998, Pettigrew and Tropp 2008, Mironova and Whitt 2017). In the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), we examine how NATO peacekeeping 
forces have reduced parochial ethnocentrism among ethnic Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. To 
measure ethnocentrism, we employ a dictator game lab-in-the-field experiment with in-group 
and out-group treatments. We conducted the dictator experiment in Bosnia in 2003 across 
locations where peacekeepers are active and present and where they are largely absent. We then 
conducted a second wave of dictator experiments in 2013 in those same locations. We find that 
while ethnocentrism has actually increased in Bosnia in the past decade, ethnocentrism is lower 
in areas where peacekeepers were once active and present. Because peacekeepers are not 
randomly deployed, we are naturally concerned about endogeneity between peacekeeper 
deployment and ethnocentric preferences in the population. However, our results are robust to a 
range of correlates of peacekeeping deployment and to a subsample of ethnic Bosnia Serbs, who 
were ex-ante opposed to the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces in their communities as 
well as highly ethnocentric. We find that even where peacekeepers were unwelcomed and 
unwanted, they appear to have a positive impact on reducing ethnocentrism, even years after 
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their departure. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the pursuit of 
positive peace. 
Literature 
 
At the macro-level, existing research underscores how peacekeeping missions may 
increase the duration and durability of peace (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Heldt 2002; 
Fortna, 2004a, 2004b; Fortna and Howard 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hegre, Hultman, 
and Nygard 2010). Third-party involvement in peacekeeping agreements and peacekeeping 
missions have also been shown to reduce the likelihood of recurrent civil war (e.g., Hartzell, 
Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Walter 
1997, 2002, Mattes and Savun 2009; Joshi and Quinn 2015). Moreover, peacekeeping missions 
appear to be more successful when the missions are accompanied by a variety of agreements 
between groups in conflict, such as economic and institutional reforms (Doyle and Sambanis 
2000, 2006). The involvement of civil society groups in peace agreements can also increase the 
durability of peace (Nilsson 2012).  
More work, however, needs to be done to understand how peacekeeping missions 
promote peace. For example, Allred (2006); Ndulo (2008); Kreps and Wallace (2009); Hultman 
(2010); and Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen (2013) find that operational cultures matter. Hegre, 
Hultman, and Nygard (2010) and Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) show that 
peacekeeper effectiveness depends on size and force strength, as well as budget size. Hultman, 
Kathman, and Shannon (2014) emphasize the importance of mandates and enforcement 
capabilities for peacekeeping success.  
Our research examines the long-term effects of peacekeeping forces at the micro-level, 
where results are often mixed. For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) find little 
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evidence that DDR programs were successful in reintegrating former combatants in Sierra 
Leone. Autesserre (2010) found that violence persisted or actually grew worse in some 
communities following the arrival of peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Mvukiyehe and Samii (2009, 2010) find that peacekeeper deployments failed to improve security 
in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. In Kosovo, Mironova and Whitt (2017) find that peacekeepers can 
have a positive effect on inter-ethnic trust when present, but raise concerns about the 
deterioration of trust once they depart.  
Our study considers the long-term effects of the deployment of NATO peacekeeping 
forces on reducing ethnocentrism in Bosnia. Understanding ethnocentrism at the micro-level is 
important because of the ongoing debate about the role of ethnic cleavages in the scholarship on 
civil war and violence at the intra-state and sub-state level (Easterly and Levine 1997; Reynal-
Querol 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoefler 2004; Cederman and Girardin 2007; 
Cederman et. al. 2010; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Denny and Walter 2014; Bosker and de Ree 
2014; Cederman et al. 2016; Toft 2017). Our focus on long-term peacebuilding and 
ethnocentrism also contributes to existing studies by developing a more comprehensive 
understanding of the success of peacekeeping missions in preventing ethnic conflict (Posen 
1993; Lake and Rothschild 1996; Sisk 1996; Walter 1997; Kimmel, 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 
2000, 2006; Sisk 2009; Toft 2009). 
Theory 
 
Can peacekeeping forces help reduce tensions in divided societies? We consider the 
plausible effect of peacekeeping forces on reducing tensions where parochial ethnic cleavages 
were an important fault line in the conflict. Specifically, we explore how peacekeepers can help 
promote broad goals of positive peace and peacebuilding after violence (Galtung 1969; Boutros-
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Ghali 1995; Kimmel 1998). Kimmel (1998: 16) conceptualizes peacebuilding as “promoting 
understanding and collaboration among a variety of individuals and groups” where 
peacebuilding “reinforces positive cultural identities and promotes cultural understanding”. 
Galtung (1964: 2) conceives of positive peace as “the integration of human society” where 
individuals overcome in-group/out-group parochial divisions to engage one another 
cooperatively. The shift in focus from negative peace (the absence of violence) to peacebuilding 
and positive peace demands an examination of the impact of peacekeepers on how individuals 
think and act toward their own in-group relative to other conflict-related out-groups. A large 
body of research in social psychology underscores how groups with exclusionary identities are 
prone to conflict (LeVine and Campbell 1972; Tajfel and Turner 1979; meta-analysis by Riek, 
Mania, and Gaertner 2006; Lake 2017). The persistence of ethnocentrism could be an important 
metric of positive peace, partially signaling one’s unwillingness to move beyond the divisions in 
society that exacerbate conflict. If citizens remain committed to ethnocentric social and political 
divisions, then the goal of lasting positive peace is hindered. 
How might peacekeeping forces encourage positive peace? Our theoretical framework is 
derived from earlier work by Mironova and Whitt (2017). We believe that peacekeeping could 
provide an important institutional mechanism to reduce fears and uncertainties that draw groups 
into conflict (Posen 1993; Petersen 2002). A large body of research emphasizes the importance 
of better institutions to sustainable peace (Sambanis 2000; Habyarimana et al. 2008).1 At the 
same time, post-war societies are often plagued by failed, weak, and divisive institutions (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998). In the absence of credible institutions, ethnic groups may still be able to 
                                                          
1 Scholars are divided on which types of institutional arrangements (ex. consociationalism, 
ethnofederalism, decentralization) are most effective for reducing tensions in postwar societies 
(Lijphart 1969; Sisk 1996; Roeder 2009; Brancati 2006; Hale 2008; Wolff 2009). Other scholars 
also argue that partition may be the only solution to managing ethnic tensions after violence 
(Mearsheimer and Pape 1993; Kaufman 1998; Downes 2004). 
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sustain peace through self-policing, but this is considered an unstable solution due to 
commitment problems and security dilemmas (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Posen 1993). 
Peacekeeping could provide an important exogenous institution to reduce security dilemmas and 
help groups better self-police, with peacekeepers serving as monitoring and enforcement agents 
on the ground. We test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The presence of peacekeeping forces reduces ethnocentrism. 
In terms of mechanisms, we argue that peacekeepers could be critical to facilitating inter-
group contact, which in turn, reduces ethnocentrism. While a vast literature shows how inter-
group contact can reduce fears, uncertainties, and prejudices against out-groups (Allport 1954, 
meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2008; Hooghe and Quintelier 2013), less is known 
about the effects of inter-group contact in the aftermath of violence, where groups may have 
strong incentives to self-segregate out of safety and security concerns (though see Mironova and 
Whitt 2014 and Scacco and Warren 2018).  
To promote inter-group contact, we believe peacekeepers could play an important 
informational role in facilitating contact by signaling what is acceptable behavior and a 
reputational role due to their monitoring and enforcement of cooperative norms and standards. In 
this sense, they work to deter potential opportunistic “spoilers” of the peace (Fearon and Laitin 
1996; Stedman, 1997; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Greenhill and Major, 2007; Blaydes and De 
Maio 2010). Through their ability to monitor and enforce cooperative norms of behavior and 
deter opportunism, the presence of peacekeepers reduces fears and uncertainties that prevent 
groups from engaging one another, keeping them parochially divided.  
We also acknowledge that peacekeepers have multiple, complex mandates, and may not 
have the capacity to police every instance of opportunism and transgression by members of rival 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
7 
 
groups. However, we argue that peacekeeper actions could have a cascading effect on reducing 
ethnocentrism over time if and when they credibly commit to monitoring and policing individual 
and group behavior. Kuran (1998) and Kuran and Sunstein (1999) identify how informational 
and reputational cascades can affect social norms and behavior in a range of contexts, including 
the transformation of ethnic norms. Mironova and Whitt (2017) illustrate with lab experiments 
how informational and reputational effects of third-party monitoring and enforcement can reduce 
ethnocentrism in a real-world peacekeeping environment. Peacekeepers reinforce norms of 
positive peace by helping ethnic groups self-police, deter entrepreneurial spoilers, and signaling 
credible commitments to monitor and enforce cooperative individual and group behavior. Those 
signals could have cascading effects on reducing ethnocentrism over time.  
In some cases, however, peacekeeping forces are not wanted or welcome and resisted by 
local populations. The success of peacekeeping missions in reducing ethnocentrism could be 
dependent on perceptions of legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Mersiades, 2005). Kelmendi 
and Radin (2016) indicate that satisfaction with UN peacekeepers in Kosovo depends on the 
perception that the UN mission furthers the agenda of one’s own ethnic group. Beardsley and 
Gleditsch (2015) and Reiter (2015) show that peacekeepers’ interventions may increase the 
legitimacy of hostile groups that undermine the peace, and Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Nilsson 
and Kovacs (2011); and Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) stress the importance of 
empowering peacekeeping forces to deter would-be spoilers. We consider a hostile population to 
be an especially crucial test of peacekeeper effects to reduce ethnocentrism. Can peacekeepers 
reduce ethnocentrism even where they are unwelcome and unwanted? 
Finally, peacekeeping missions are ephemeral institutions by design. Even if 
peacekeepers are successful at reducing ethnocentrism, what happens once they depart? Gilligan 
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and Sergenti (2008) and Costalli (2014) find UN peacekeepers are short-term solutions to 
conflict, and may not serve to predict or prevent subsequent violence. Mironova and Whitt 
(2017) express concern about the sustainability of positive peace once peacekeepers depart. Of 
course, peacekeeping forces do not operate in a vacuum, and peacekeepers typically are 
supported by a range of multilateral domestic and international institutions. If those institutions 
matter more than peacekeeping forces to the process of peacebuilding, then the presence or 
absence of peacekeeping forces could be a null point after an extended period of time. 
Peacekeepers draw down as other institutions emerge and strengthen. We evaluate whether 
norms of positive peace are sustainable following the departure of peacekeepers or whether 
people revert back to parochial ethnic ties in the absence of sustainable alternatives to 
institutional guarantees provided by peacekeepers. 
Rationale for Case Selection 
 
Bosnia is a useful case for examining the long-term effects of peacekeeping missions on 
reducing ethnic tension. While scholars typically dispute ethnocentric explanations for the 
Bosnia war as overly simplistic (Woodward 1995, Gagnon 2006; Weidman 2011; Bieber and 
Galijas 2016), scholars have identified enduring challenges of post-war ethnocentrism in Bosnia. 
First, the Dayton Agreement created complex power-sharing arrangements that institutionalized 
war-time ethnic cleavages into the political process (Woodward 1999, Bose 2002; Bieber 2006; 
Keil and Kudlenko 2015). The war led to the establishment of Republika Srpska as an 
ethnoterritorial entity controlled by Bosnian Serbs, alongside the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a power-sharing arrangement between Bosniaks and Croats (Toal and Dahlman 
2011). Second, the electoral system established in the aftermath of the civil war also reified 
ethnic divisions, and prioritized the power of ethnocentric political leaders (Belloni 2006, 2008). 
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The ethnocratic political order of the post-war settlement appears to have encouraged 
ethnocentrism in the populace. Dyrstad’s (2012) comparison of ethnocentrism in pre-war and 
post-war surveys shows that multi-ethnic Bosnia experience pronounced changes in opinions: 
from very low to remarkably high levels of ethnocentrism between 1989 and 2003.2 While 
avoiding another war, scholars still point to problems of self-governance in Bosnia and the need 
for deep structural reforms to mitigate the further entrenchment of ethnocentrism in Bosnian 
society (McMahon 2004; Bieber 2006; Jeffery 2012; Perry 2015; Hulsey 2015; Džankić, 2015). 
Bosnia also has a long history of peacekeeping engagement (Burg and Shoup 1999; 
Pickering 2007; Baumann et. al. 2015). The war-time United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) mission that began in 1992 under UNSCR 1031 ended in 1995 with the signing 
of the Dayton Accords (see SI Appendix for more details). As part of the Dayton agreement, 
UNPROFOR would be replaced by a NATO-led peacekeeping operation called Implementation 
Force (IFOR), consisting of over 60,000 peacekeepers deployed to different regions of Bosnia, 
including three major division-strength bases in Tuzla led by the United States (MTF-N), in 
Banja Luka led by France (MFT-W), and in Mostar led by the United Kingdom (MTF-S). 
Smaller battalion-strength operations were also based in other locations such as Sarajevo, Doboj, 
and Zenica.3 However, in many other regions of Bosnia, peacekeeper operations were limited to 
“theatre patrols” without permanent bases on the ground. IFOR was reconfigured in 1996 into a 
stabilization force (SFOR) and peacekeepers were gradually drawn down to about 13,000 
                                                          
2 Pre-war survey research by Burg and Berbaum (1989), Hodson et. al. (1994), Sekulic et al. 
(1994) pointed to strong traditions of tolerance and cosmopolitanism in Bosnia.  
3 The Dayton Agreement: Annex 1A: Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Article VI 
Deployment of the Implementation Force states that IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavor) would 
have complete freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and that IFOR brigades and battalion 
locations would be determined by IFOR command.  The choice of IFOR deployment locations 
was based on a combination of strategic goals as well as logistical and safety concerns. Wentz et. 
al. (1998) offer rationales for the deployment of forces to lower elevation urban areas with better 
infrastructure resources. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
10 
 
deployed by 2003. In 2004, SFOR again transitioned to the European-led EUFOR Althea, which 
still maintains approximately 600 peacekeepers in Bosnia to date.4 
As in most conflicts, peacekeeping forces were not deployed randomly, but were sent to 
areas of strategic importance, often where they were deemed most needed (SI Appendix Figure 
1). Peacekeeping forces were also not always welcome or wanted by local populations. US 
government public opinion surveys show that most Bosnian Serbs held highly negative views of 
NATO after the war, Bosnian Croats were often wary of NATO, while Bosniaks were widely 
supportive of NATO after the war (SI Appendix Figures 2-4). This leads us to consider whether 
the long-term success of peacekeeping efforts depends on public support for their operations, and 
Bosnia offers a useful case for assessing effects of NATO peacekeeping efforts on reducing 
ethnocentrism in welcoming as opposed to potentially hostile populations. Finally, the 
withdrawal of most peacekeeping forces after 2004 allows us to assess what happens to 
ethnocentrism after peacekeepers have largely departed. To what extent could peacekeeper 
effects, if any, be permanent and enduring? 
Research Design 
 
 To measure ethnocentrism, we first employ a range of survey instruments across time.5 
We rely on survey data from nationally represented surveys conducted in Bosnia by the U.S. 
                                                          
4 An important scope condition for our study is that Bosnian peacekeepers were deployed as part 
of a clearly negotiated settlement and accompanied by a large body of international civilian 
organizations tasked with implementing the peace agreement. Prior UNPROFOR peacekeepers, 
in contrast, were deployed in Bosnia in the absence of a clear peace agreement or a 
multidimensional civilian component and failed to stem mass violence.  
5 We consider ethno-nationalism – the desire for an ethnic political homeland with explicit 
ethno-political representation - as conceptually distinct from ethnocentrism, a tendency to 
identify with and favor one’s in-group strongly over out-groups in attitudes and preferences. Our 
survey and experimental instruments provide better measures of ethnocentrism than ethno-
nationalism. 
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government, the UN Development Program, and USAID.6 To establish baselines for 
ethnocentrism prior to the deployment of NATO peacekeepers, we use a nationwide survey of 
Bosnia conducted by the U.S. government in December 1995. To assess the impact of 
peacekeepers, we employ other survey measures of ethnocentrism provided by UNDP/USAID 
data from 2006 through 2011.7 At each point in time, we compare levels of ethnocentrism in 
regions of Bosnia where peacekeepers were deployed to those where peacekeepers were largely 
absent.  
As a robustness check on our survey results, we also utilize a behavioral measure of 
ethnocentrism: a lab-in-the-field experiment commonly known as the dictator game (Kahneman, 
Knetsch & Thaler, 1986; Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996; Camerer 2003). In the dictator 
game, the subject (the dictator) decides how to allocate a sum of money between him/herself and 
an anonymous recipient. The dictator game can be used to measure self-interest, altruism, 
charitable giving, other-regarding preferences, and under varying treatments, can be used to 
measure “tastes for discrimination” against others (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Engel 2011).  
Our dictator game is a product of the experimental protocols and data collected in 2003 
by Whitt and Wilson (2007) and replicated in 2013 by Mironova and Whitt (2016).8 Subjects 
take part in two dictator games in a within-subject design. We have subjects complete a dictator 
game first with a co-ethnic (in-group) recipient and then a non-coethnic (out-group) recipient.9 
                                                          
6 Replication files for this article are available at the Political Behavior dataverse: 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SISU79  
7 Ideally, our survey instruments from the US government and UNDP/USAID surveys would be 
identical for a difference in difference design. However, we would argue that if ethnocentric 
attitudes were prominent in the population, both sets of instruments should identify it.  
8 Neither study considered possible peacekeeping effects on ethnocentrism when examining these 
data. 
9 Subjects are given an envelope and asked to allocate a 10-unit sum of money to first an in-
group recipient followed by an out-group recipient of random ethnicity using explicit ethnic cues 
[respondent is Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serb]. Whatever is placed in the envelope is sent 
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Protocol details are provided in the supplementary appendix. The difference between what is sent 
to an in-group recipient compared to an out-group recipient is used as a behavioral measure of 
ethnocentrism. Because the second wave of experiments was conducted after most peacekeepers 
departed, we can use a difference-in-difference design to assess the longer-term impact of any 
peacekeeper effects on ethnocentrism: comparing the 2003 wave where peacekeepers are still 
largely present to the 2013 wave where most have departed.10 
 Finally, because our data are observational in nature, the non-random deployment of 
peacekeepers creates endogeneity challenges for causal inference. We will attempt to control for 
a number of potential correlates of peacekeeper deployment and other possible confounders in 
our analysis. Our multi-wave design is also helpful in controlling for time-invariant confounders. 
We will also examine whether there are peacekeeper effects on subsamples of the Bosnian 
population, including those which were opposed to peacekeeping forces being deployed into 
their communities (namely, the Bosnian Serbs). 
Data Collection and Sampling 
 
Nationwide surveys by the U.S. government, UNDP/USAID and our behavioral 
experiments were conducted using similar sampling methods by reputable research firms in 
Bosnia. Sampling was done using a multi-stage stratified random sample design with ethnic and 
urban/rural strata. Municipalities were selected using the probability proportion to size method 
and neighborhoods and local villages were randomly selected from those municipalities. 
Enumerators used a random route technique to identify households and individuals 18 and over 
were selected from households using the most recent birthday as a final selection key. Surveys 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to an out-group recipient at a future experimental location. Whatever the subjects keep is theirs 
to take home.  
10 Unfortunately, we do not have baseline behavioral measures of ethnocentrism from 1995 prior 
to NATO peacekeeper arrival. 
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were administered in respondents’ homes by trained enumerators working for various research 
firms in Bosnia.  
For the behavioral experiments, research firms followed the same general sampling 
protocols. However, instead of conducting the experiments at home, subjects were brought by a 
local enumerator to a central location (school, community center, hotel conference room) where 
experimental sessions took place. Subjects conducted the experiment in groups of approx. 18-20, 
and were seated behind large screens for privacy. Local enumerators used a standard script to 
conduct the experiment (See Appendix for Protocols). In total, there were 681 participants in the 
2003 study and 449 in the follow-up replication in 2013.11 Summary statistics on key 
demographic variables are provided online (SI Appendix Table 1). We note that the two studies 
are mostly well balanced on demographics and turn-out rates were consistently high (approx. 
80%) for both studies, which we believe is due to monetary incentives to participate.12 Overall, 
the 2013 study appears to be a fair replication of the Whitt and Wilson (2007) study. Finally, 
while the Bosnian population experienced great internal upheaval during the war, the postwar 
population was largely stable between our two points in time, reducing concerns about selection 
bias between the 2003 and 2013 samples due to migration.13 Our survey and experimental 
samples should be comparable across different locations and across time. 
Endogeneity Analysis 
First, we acknowledge that peacekeepers in Bosnia were not randomly deployed, so we 
conducted an endogeneity analysis for potential observable correlates of peacekeeper 
                                                          
11 Due to budgetary restrictions, we reduced the sample size in the 2013 replication.  
12 See the SI Tables 1A-B for balance tables between 2003 and 2013 and between peacekeeping 
vs. non-peacekeeping regions.  
13 See Tuathail and O’Loughlin (2009) for a discussion of post-war migration and refugee return 
in Bosnia. Since the war, however, Bosnia is also experiencing a net negative migration rate, 
suggestive of a “brain drain” (See MGD Achievement Fund 2012;  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM) 
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deployment. Using logit models, we find that peacekeepers are deployed primarily to urban 
areas, where ethnic Bosniaks reside, and in areas which are more ethnically mixed and have 
experienced more severe war-time conflict (SI Appendix Table 2).14 Hence, we will control for 
these endogenous covariates in the subsequent analysis. We are also especially concerned about 
whether peacekeepers may have been deployed to areas with ex-ante lower levels of 
ethnocentrism. On one hand, urban areas that were historically more intermixed could be less 
ethnocentric than more homogeneous rural areas.15 On the other, many ethnically mixed urban 
areas experienced severe conflict and ethnic cleansing, which could have intensified 
ethnocentrism after the war.   
Fortunately, we know from U.S. government and Yugoslav-era survey data that ethnic 
groups in Bosnia, while exhibiting high levels of prewar tolerance, had become extremely 
polarized in the immediate aftermath of the war and before the deployment of NATO 
peacekeepers (SI Appendix Table 3, Figures 5-10).16 Using data from a December 1995 U.S. 
government survey (immediately after the Dayton Agreement but before the deployment of 
NATO peacekeepers), we find that ethnocentric attitudes do not differ significantly in future 
peacekeeping regions compared to non-peacekeeping areas. Figure 1 reports the expected value 
from OLS regression models where the dependent variable is a survey measure of in-group and 
out-group favorability and the key independent variable is whether a location would be the site 
                                                          
14 Estimates of war casualties were obtained from the Research and Documentation Center 
(RDC), Sarajevo. See Ball et. al. (2007). 
15 Using pre-war 1989 survey data, Sekulic et. al.(1994) show that Bosnians in general were the 
most ethnically tolerant of former Yugoslav republics, especially in urban ethnically mixed 
areas. 
16 U.S. government surveys were conducted by the Office of Opinion Research in the former 
U.S. Information Agency, which has since been incorporated into the State Department. 
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of a future division or battalion level NATO deployment.17 We find that ethnocentric attitudes 
are not significantly different between peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping regions for all three 
ethnic groups. This reduces concerns that peacekeepers were deployed primarily to less 
ethnocentric areas. 
 
Figure 1. Ethnocentrism by Ethnicity, Peacekeeper vs. Non-Peacekeeper Regions (Dec. 1995) 
 
We also know that ethnic groups were deeply divided in their support of NATO 
peacekeeper deployment at the end of the war.  U.S. government surveys indicate that Bosnian 
                                                          
17 Views of In and Out Groups – “Please tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat 
favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of: [Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, 
Bosnian Serbs]” 1 = very unfavorable to 4 = very favorable. Responses are combined into an 
additive index for views of out-groups for each ethnic group. See SI Table 4 for full regression 
models. 
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Serb were strongly opposed to NATO at the onset of deployment and remained so throughout the 
next decade; Bosniaks were always quite favorable toward NATO; and Bosnian Croats’ views of 
NATO fluctuated but then steadily improved over time (SI Appendix Figures 2-4). Using data 
from a December 1995 U.S. government survey, Figure 2 reports the expected values from OLS 
regressions where the dependent variable is support for NATO in December 1995 and the key 
independent variables are ethnicity and a dummy variable for whether a location would be a site 
for future peacekeeper deployment.18 Figure 2 shows that Bosniaks are significantly more 
favorable toward NATO in areas where peacekeepers will eventually deploy (Tuzla, Mostar, 
Sarajevo) compared to Bosniaks in other areas. Serbs, however, are somewhat more opposed to 
NATO in future peacekeeping areas (mainly Banja Luka) than Serbs in other areas, while there 
are no significant differences in Croat attitudes toward NATO across different regions. To reduce 
concerns about the endogeneity of peacekeeper deployments to areas where peacekeepers were 
widely supported, we will evaluate the impact of peacekeeping on ethnocentrism in places where 
peacekeepers were initially unwelcomed and unwanted: areas of Bosnian Serb concentration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Views of Nato – “what is your opinion of the decision to deploy 60,000 NATO peacekeeping 
troops to Bosnia?” 1 = strongly oppose to 4 = strongly support. See SI Table 5 for full regression 
results. 
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Figure 2. Expected Value of NATO Support by Ethnicity, Peacekeeper Region (Dec. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of Peacekeepers on Ethnocentric Attitudes 
 
We first assess the impact of peacekeepers on ethnocentric attitudes using longitudinal 
survey data conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) between 2006 and 
2010 as part of its Early Warning Report program. In this period of time, peacekeepers had been 
present in Bosnia for over a decade and were still actively deployed in the same locations, 
though in fewer numbers than in 1995. Ideally, we would have common survey instruments to 
compare how ethnocentric attitudes changed from 1995 before the deployment of peacekeepers 
to different periods of time after peacekeepers for a difference-in-difference design. The UNDP 
focused on attitudes of political and social inclusiveness while the U.S. government surveys 
addressed more general favorable/unfavorable views of in-groups relative to out-groups.  
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However, we find a great deal of consistency when comparing across the two instruments; 
subjects tend to respond in ways favorable to their in-group over out-groups (See SI Appendix 
Table 6). If ethnocentric attitudes were prevalent in the population, we should observe it clearly 
in response to the different survey items.  
Based on UNDP data from 2006-2010, we find positive effects of peacekeeper 
deployment on broad measures of political and social inclusiveness. For political inclusiveness, 
the UNDP surveys ask subjects whether it is acceptable/unacceptable to live in the same state 
with Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. For social inclusiveness UNDP surveys ask subjects whether it 
would be acceptable/unacceptable to have Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as neighbors.19 Table 1 
indicates the results of ordered logit regression analysis on political and social inclusion. The 
results are drawn from thirteen nationally representative surveys with over 21,000 observations. 
The key independent variable is a dummy variable for whether peacekeepers were deployed to a 
given region. Regressions also control for the timing of the survey, subject ethnicity, gender, age, 
education, and urban/rural demographics.20 Table 1 reveals that subjects from regions with 
peacekeepers are significantly more supportive of the political and social inclusion of out-groups 
compared to subjects from non-peacekeeper regions across different points in time. There are 
also independent effects of time on the improvement of social and political inclusive attitudes, 
and Bosniaks are more welcoming of outgroups than Bosnian Croats or Serbs. Hence, compared 
to the onset of peacekeeper deployments in 1995, where US government surveys found high 
levels of ethnocentrism throughout Bosnia, the follow-up 2006-2010 UNDP surveys show 
                                                          
19 Political Inclusion DV. How acceptable/unacceptable is it for you to live in the same state with 
[Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks]? [1 = completely unacceptable to 4 = completely acceptable] 
Social Inclusion DV = How acceptable/unacceptable is it for [Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks] to live in 
your neighborhood? [1 = completely unacceptable to 4 = completely acceptable] 
20 The UNDP surveys did not include measures of individual-level war-time victimization, which 
we acknowledge as a potentially important limitation of the data. 
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reduced ethnocentrism in peacekeeping regions compared non-peacekeeping regions. Although 
these results are not definitive evidence of a causal effect of peacekeeping, they support our 
hypothesis that ethnocentrism is reduced by the presence of peacekeeping forces.  
Table 1. Peacekeepers and Support for Political and Social Inclusion of Out-Groups (UNDP 
DATA 2006-2010) 
 
 Political Inclusion Social Inclusion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Share 
State with 
Bosniaks 
Share 
State with  
Croats 
Share 
State with 
Serbs 
Neighbors 
with 
Bosniaks 
Neighbors 
with  
Croats 
Neighbors 
with 
Serbs 
peacekeepers 0.555** 0.586** 0.395** 0.522** 0.551** 0.379** 
 (0.106) (0.114) (0.0832) (0.0876) (0.113) (0.0791) 
time 0.0222* 0.0457** 0.0519** 0.0147 0.0314** 0.0559** 
 (0.0135) (0.0118) (0.0195) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0192) 
Bosniak subject  2.068** 1.515**  1.991** 1.544** 
  (0.128) (0.108)  (0.134) (0.102) 
Croat subject 0.200   0.0650   
 (0.103)   (0.0865)   
female 0.0877* 0.0135 0.0132 0.0792* -0.00829 0.0123 
 (0.0424) (0.0673) (0.0581) (0.0370) (0.0732) (0.0611) 
age 0.00276 0.00455** 0.00181 0.00413 0.00499** 0.00238 
 (0.00330) (0.00127) (0.00281) (0.00352) (0.00138) (0.00268) 
education -0.162** -0.113** -0.116 -0.174** -0.123** -0.118 
 (0.0589) (0.0388) (0.0870) (0.0581) (0.0406) (0.0865) 
village -0.101 -0.223** -0.0629 -0.111 -0.272** -0.0814 
 (0.0518) (0.0575) (0.0581) (0.0594) (0.0576) (0.0642) 
       
Constant 1 -1.576** -0.948** -0.783 -1.818** -1.482** -0.571 
 (0.458) (0.330) (0.563) (0.361) (0.270) (0.560) 
Constant 2 -0.577 0.0726 0.179 -0.735* -0.421 0.489 
 (0.454) (0.338) (0.556) (0.367) (0.270) (0.578) 
Constant 3 0.783 1.599** 1.395* 0.576 1.109** 1.625** 
 (0.495) (0.332) (0.612) (0.396) (0.267) (0.617) 
Out-groups Only Croats, 
Serbs Only 
Serbs, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Croats, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Croats, 
Serbs Only 
Serbs, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Croats, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Observations 11,748 16,065 15,330 11,734 16,056 15,324 
adj. r2 0.00923 0.126 0.0768 0.00830 0.118 0.0789 
ll -13932 -12049 -12093 -14182 -12228 -12575 
Robust standard errors clustered by survey wave in parentheses. 
See SI Table 15 for variable description and coding, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Effects of Peacekeepers on Ethnocentric Behavior 
 
 Next, we evaluate whether peacekeepers might have a substantive impact on ethnocentric 
behavior. Though we do not have baseline behavioral data prior to the deployment of 
peacekeepers, we do have experimental data from two distinct points in time which rely on the 
same instruments to measure ethnocentrism. The first point in time is 2003, when peacekeepers 
were still largely active in Bosnia. The second point is 2013, after most peacekeepers had 
departed. We can use a difference-in-difference analysis to assess whether any peacekeeper 
effect present during the first wave of experiments persists to the second wave.  
 We begin by examining variation in our key dependent variable – dictator game measures 
of ethnocentrism. Figure 3 reports the incidence of in-group bias in the dictator game, which is 
coded 1 if the subject sent more money to an in=group member than an out-group member and 0 
if otherwise. Figure 3 shows that on average subjects sent more money to an in-group recipient 
than an out-group recipient in both the baseline (2003) and follow-up (2013) studies. Hence, 
ethnocentrism is clearly evident in subject behavior. However, Figure 3 also indicates what 
appears to be a plausible peacekeeping effect on ethnocentrism. Comparisons of peacekeeper to 
non-peacekeeper regions indicate that mean in-group bias is significantly lower in peacekeeper 
regions both at baseline (34% vs. 45%, t = 2.85, p <0.003) and at follow-up (48% vs. 68%, t = 
3.81, p <0.0001), even after almost all peacekeepers had departed. At the same time, in-group 
bias has also increased dramatically from 2003 to 2013 in both peacekeeper (t = 3.42, p< 0.0003) 
and non-peacekeeper regions (t = 4.54, p<0.000).  
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Figure 3. Peacekeepers and In-group Bias in the Dictator Game at Baseline vs. Follow-up (with 
95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
To investigate further, Table 2 provides the results of difference-in-difference analysis of 
the effects of peacekeeping on in-group bias. While overall in-group bias increases between 2003 
and 2013 in both peacekeeper and non-peacekeeper regions, the net change in in-group bias 
between peacekeeping regions and non-peacekeeping regions (the difference-in-difference) is 
not statistically significant (t = -1.07). This is remarkable given the departure of most 
peacekeeping forces in Bosnia over this same period of time. Noting that peacekeeper and non-
peacekeeper regions were both strongly ethnocentric in 1995 according to U.S. government 
surveys, the deployment of NATO peacekeepers appears to have exerted a considerable effect on 
the reduction of ethnocentrism where present. Furthermore, once peacekeepers departed, 
ethnocentrism in areas with peacekeeping forces did not converge to levels of non-peacekeeping 
areas, which suggests a potential long-term positive effect of peacekeeping on the reduction of 
ethnocentric behavior.  
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Table 2. Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Peacekeeper Effects over Time 
 
 
2003 
(BL = Baseline) 
2013 
(FU = Follow-up) 
Diff-in-
Diff 
 
No Peace- 
keepers 
Peace- 
keepers 
Diff  
(BL) 
No Peace- 
keepers 
Peace- 
keepers 
Diff  
(FU) 
(BL vs. 
FU) 
In-group 
bias 0.451 0.340 -0.111 0.654 0.478 -0.176 -0.065 
SE 0.034 0.023 0.046 0.031 0.034 0.046 0.060 
t 14.26 14.78 -2.84 20.90 14.27 -3.83 -1.07 
P > |t| 
  
0.005** 
  
0.000** 0.283 
** p<0.01 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
One possibility is that the peacekeeping effect we observe could be easily confounded. 
We now evaluate whether the peacekeeping effect is robust to the inclusion of observable 
covariates of peacekeeper deployment. To estimate the effect of peacekeepers on behavior at a 
given point in time and location, we employ logit regression models. Our main dependent 
variable is the logistic transformation of the binary variable (Υitl) which is coded 1 if the 
individual (i) display an in-group bias in the dictator game and 0 if not at a given time (t) and 
location (l). Our key explanatory variable is the binary variable (Πitl) denoting whether 
peacekeepers were deployed where an individual lives = 1 or not = 0. Among controls (Xitl), we 
include individual-level variation in ethnicity, gender, age, education, and unemployment.21 We 
also control for regional level covariates that are endogenous to peacekeeper deployments (rural 
environment, ethnically mixed regions, war severity). Standard errors are clustered by location. 
To estimate the effect of peacekeepers on behavior over time, we pool the data and introduce a 
binary temporal variable (Titl) where 0 = 2003 and 1 = 2013. To capture the effects of 
peacekeeper deployment over time, we include an interaction term (Πitl*Titl).  
                                                          
21 We also examine a subsample of victims of violence. We only have individual level 
victimization data from 2013 due to IRB restrictions on asking about victimization in the 2003 
study. 
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Table 3 below reports the regression results. Models 1-2 show that while ethnocentrism 
has increased between 2003 and 2013, the presence of peacekeepers has a robust negative effect 
on in-group bias at each point in time, as well as in the pooled Model 3. Consistent with 
difference-in-difference analysis, the interaction term between peacekeepers and time is not 
significant meaning that the effect of peacekeeping forces on ethnocentrism is fairly constant 
across time, even though peacekeepers have largely departed by 2013. Figure 4 presents the 
predicted probabilities derived from model 3 in Table 3. These probabilities demonstrate that 
there are higher levels of in-group bias in 2013 in comparison to 2003. However, regions with 
peacekeepers have lower levels of in-group bias in comparison to regions without peacekeepers. 
The differences in the probability of exhibiting in-group bias between regions with and without 
peacekeepers are statistically significant (distinguishable from zero at a 95 percent confidence 
level) in both years. The differences in probability are between 0.1 and 0.2 for both years which 
suggests that respondents in peacekeeper regions were from 10 to 20 percent less likely to 
exhibit in-group bias in the dictator game. Substantively, the peacekeeper regions exhibit 
reduced ethnocentrism in comparison to non-peacekeeper regions, and the peacekeeper effect is 
relatively consistent over time.   
Other correlates of peacekeeper deployment (war severity, ethnic fractionalization, etc.) 
are not significant, and individual demographic controls are also not significant or inconsistent.22 
In model 4 of Table 3, the results hold when controlling for attitudinal measures of 
ethnocentrism (in-group ties and outgroup threat perception) as well as trust in NATO. Another 
concern for us is that our results might be confounded by other unobserved omitted variables. 
                                                          
22 Individual level victimization is significantly correlated with a reduction in in-group bias in the 
follow-up model but we lack comparable victimization data for 2003. This finding is consistent 
with other behavioral studies of pro-sociality among victims of violence (see Bauer et. al. 2016). 
Unemployment is also negatively correlated with in-group bias in the 2003 study.  
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However, using the Altonji et. al. (2005) method for dealing with selection on unobservables, we 
estimate that the effect of an unobserved confounder would need to be nearly six times greater 
than all observables in our pooled model 4 to explain away the effect of peacekeepers, which 
suggests that the inclusion of additional controls is unlikely to nullify our results.23 Finally, as an 
additional robustness check (model 5 of Table 3), we find that peacekeeper effects are robust to 
subsamples of the Bosnian population, specifically to Bosnian Serbs, who held the most 
unfavorable views of NATO prior to NATO peacekeeper deployment in their communities. The 
effects of peacekeepers on Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats are similarly robust.24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 To assess how much greater the effect of an unobserved variable would need to be relative to 
observable factors to explain away a key explanatory variable, Altonji et. al. (2005) use a ratio of 
regression coefficients from models with full and restricted control variables (βF/(βR-βF). In our 
case, the restricted coefficient is obtained when only controlling for peacekeepers, which is  
βR =  -0.687 (SE = 0.161, p< 0.0000). The ratio of full to restricted models is 5.87.  
24 In additional models, we found that the peacekeeping effect is also robust to more socio-
economic controls, changes in municipal level economic conditions (which may proxy for 
confounding effects of international aid following peacekeeper deployments), and changes in 
ethnic fractionalization from the 1991 to 2013 population censuses, and restricted samples of 
more rural and ethnically homogenous areas of Bosnia. We also find the peacekeeping effect is 
robust to coarsened exact matching, inverse probability weighting, and propensity score 
matching. See SI Appendix Tables 8-11, 17.  
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Table 3. Effects of Peacekeepers/Time on Ethnocentrism (Logit Regression). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2003 + 2013 
(5) 
  2003  2013  2003 + 2013 Serbs Only 
Peacekeeper region -0.733** -0.669** -0.563* -0.587** -0.842** 
 (0.211) (0.201) (0.224) (0.207) (0.280) 
Year 2013   0.806** 0.479* 0.459* 
   (0.217) (0.235) (0.230) 
Peacekeeper regions* 
Year 2013 
  -0.247 
(0.266) 
-0.169 
(0.263) 
-0.0625 
(0.337) 
Feeling close to one’s 
ethnicity 
   0.552** 
(0.0844) 
0.278* 
(0.123) 
Feeling unsafe around 
other ethnicities  
   0.169 
(0.0908) 
0.161 
(0.0969) 
Trust in NATO    -0.0700 -0.312** 
    (0.0551) (0.0815) 
Bosnjak 0.462 -0.154 0.355 0.384  
 (0.346) (0.219) (0.328) (0.318)  
Croat -0.0907 0.895** 0.252 0.220  
 (0.215) (0.154) (0.184) (0.165)  
Female 0.166 0.154 0.0695 0.192 0.369* 
 (0.236) (0.254) (0.133) (0.124) (0.223) 
Age -0.00108 -0.00131 0.00375 0.00306 -0.0104 
 (0.00516) (0.0107) (0.00437) (0.00506) (0.00736) 
Education 0.163 -0.132 0.0263 0.0608 0.320 
 (0.134) (0.0876) (0.0930) (0.0916) (0.295) 
Rural region 0.0244 0.0102 -0.00527 -0.0428 0.259* 
 (0.0865) (0.132) (0.0717) (0.0857) (0.104) 
Unemployed -0.512** -0.192 -0.389* -0.395* -0.997** 
 (0.173) (0.340) (0.181) (0.156) (0.321) 
Ethnically mixed 
municipality 
-0.0195 
(0.361) 
-0.0542 
(0.103) 
-0.179 
(0.288) 
0.0877 
(0.248) 
0.246 
(0.228) 
Log(wardeaths) 0.0775 0.0848 0.0593 -0.0227 0.0295 
 (0.0834) (0.0614) (0.0456) (0.0444) (0.112) 
Victimization during 
the war 
N/A -1.118 
(0.498) 
   
Constant -1.159 2.040 -0.792 -1.510** -1.576 
 (0.617) (1.443) (0.465) (0.566) (1.722) 
Survey Responses 670 449 1,119 1,046 336 
Pseudo-R2 0.0316 0.0581 0.0481 0.0873 0.121 
Log likelihood -431.5 -288.7 -734.7 -659.4 -203.0 
Dependent variable: 1 (Exhibiting in-group bias), 0 (Not exhibiting in-group bias) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by location 
See SI Table 15 for variable description and coding. ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Figure 4: In-group bias by year and the presence of
peacekeepers with 95 percent confidence intervals
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We also consider whether our dictator game is a poor measure of ethnocentrism. 
However, we find that our experimental measures are comparable to other survey indicators of 
ethnocentrism, and one advantage of the experiments is that posturing is costly to participants 
(See discussion around SI Table 6). Dictator in-group bias is also well-correlated with survey 
measures of in-group social distance and threat perceptions of out-groups, which serves as an 
internal validity check on our experimental design (SI Table 12). Consistent with in-group bias 
in the dictator game, attitudinal ties to one’s in-group increase between 2003 and 2013 (t = 9.47, 
p < 0.0000) as do out-group threat perceptions (t = 4.63, p < 0.0000). This is suggestive (though 
not definitive) of a mechanism where the absence or removal of peacekeepers heightens threat 
perceptions of out-groups that make people turn inward and revert back to ethnocentrism over 
time, heightening ethnic security dilemmas. The negative effects of the removal of peacekeepers 
may be worsened if peacekeepers are not supplemented with other integrative institutions to 
facilitate peaceful, cooperative inter-group contact. 
Finally, our experimental study was conducted at only two points in time. However, the 
consistency of experimental findings with results from the 2006-2010 survey data encourages us 
that our observations are not simply an anomaly or peculiarity of experimental design, sampling 
methodologies, or are sensitive to historical effects of the timing of our two studies. The 
peacekeeper effect we observe appear robust to different attitudinal and behavioral measures of 
ethnocentrism and are observable across time.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 What impact can peacekeeping forces have on long-term prospects for positive peace? 
Using the case of NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia, we find a significant reduction in ethnocentric 
behavior in areas where peacekeeping forces were actively deployed after the war compared to 
regions with less contact with peacekeepers. Our findings are robust to controls for observable 
correlates of peacekeeper deployment (war severity, ethnic fractionalization, urban areas) and to 
individual demographic controls. We find that reductions in ethnocentric behavior are sustained 
even after the departure of peacekeeping forces and our observations take place over the span of 
a decade. This effect is noted even for Bosnian Serb populations who were highly ethnocentric 
and opposed to NATO from the onset. Our results suggest that peacekeepers can have a positive 
effect on positive peace even when they are largely unwelcome and unwanted by local 
populations. Our findings speak to the potentially critical role that peacekeeping deployments 
can play in the promotion of positive peace after violence, decreasing in-group bias among 
formerly warring factions. Respondents in peacekeeping regions were between 10 and 20 percent 
less likely to exhibit in-group bias.   
More broadly, our findings support Alexander and Cristia (2011) and Michelitch (2015), 
showing how institutional contexts affect pro-social and parochial behavior. We find that 
peacekeepers may help create contexts that encourage more prosocial behavior towards out-
groups (less in-group bias in the dictator game). These results suggest that the presence of 
peacekeepers helps to promote cooperative norms among ethnic groups, in comparison to areas 
without peacekeepers, which are more parochial. We find it encouraging that there is a legacy of 
pro-social behavior toward out-groups even after peacekeepers depart. On the other hand, we 
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also observe increases in ethnocentrism throughout Bosnia over time, which raises concerns 
about the long-term sustainability of pro-sociality among ethnically parochial groups.  
Finally, due to the limitations of our data, we can only speculate here about causal 
mechanisms which must be evaluated in future research. We have suggested that peacekeepers 
work to reduce fears and uncertainties that fuel security dilemmas (Posen 1993) and that the 
presence of peacekeepers has a cascading effect on the transmission of pro-social codes of 
behavior (Kuran 1998). Our results also appear consistent with third-party monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms proposed by Mironova and Whitt (2017) using lab experiments in 
peacekeeping regions of neighboring Kosovo. In the absence of credible alternatives to 
peacekeepers to monitor and enforce peace, we imagine that the departure of peacekeepers could 
lead to a reverse cascade of fear and mistrust, heightening security dilemmas and leading 
potentially to recurrent violence. Indeed, in Bosnia we find that ethnocentrism, out-group threat 
perceptions, and in-group affinities have increased over time, which signals that more needs to 
be done to expand and reform institutions of integration (Keil and Kudlenko 2015). 
Nevertheless, our results offer encouragement that peacekeepers can play a proactive and 
potentially enduring role in promoting positive peace.  
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Data Collection and Sampling for Dictator Games 
 
 
We replicate the fieldwork conducted by Whitt and Wilson (2007) using the same sampling 
protocols in the same locations. Sampling was done using a multi-stage stratified random sample 
design with ethnic and urban/rural strata. Municipalities were selected using the probability 
proportion to size method and neighborhoods and local villages were randomly selected from those 
municipalities. Enumerators used a random route technique to identify households and individuals 
18 and over were selected from households using the most recent birthday as a final selection key. 
Subjects were then brought by a local enumerator to a central location (school, community center, 
hotel conference room) where experimental sessions took place. Subjects conducted the 
experiment in groups of approx. 18-20, and were seated behind large screens for privacy. Local 
enumerators use the same standard script as Whitt and Wilson to conduct the experiment (2007). 
In total, there were 681 participants in the 2003 study and 449 in the follow-up replication. 
Summary statistics on key demographic variables are provided below in Table 1. We note that the 
two studies are mostly well balanced on demographics and turn-out rates were consistently high 
(approx. 80%) for both studies, which we believe is due to monetary incentives to participate. 
Overall, we believe we conducted a reasonably fair replication of the Whitt and Wilson (2007) 
study. Finally, while the Bosnian population experienced great internal upheaval during the war, 
the postwar population was largely stable between our two points in time, reducing concerns about 
selection bias between the 2003 and 2013 samples due to migration.1 Our two samples should be 
comparable across different locations and across time. 
                                                          
1 See Tuathail and O’Loughlon (2009) for a discussion of post-war migration and refugee return 
in Bosnia. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance 
 
A. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests between 2003 and 2013 
 
 2003 2013 KS Balance 
   Combined D 
Proportion (SD) 
Serbs 0.32 (0.018) 0.33 (0.022) 0.01 
Croats 0.30 (0.018) 0.27 (0.021) 0.04 
Bosniaks 0.38 (0.019) 0.40 (0.023) 0.02 
Female 0.48 (0.019) 0.39 (0.023) 0.09* 
Unemployed 0.28 (0.017) 0.25 (0.020) 0.03 
Mean (SD) 
Age 35.4 (13.4) 36.0 (15.0) 0.06 
Education 2.98 (0.72) 2.84 (0.83) 0.06 
Rural 1.72 (1.04) 1.50 (0.87) 0.08* 
Ethnically mixed 
municipality 
0.61 (0.49) 0.53 (0.50) 0.08 
Survey Responses 680 449  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
B. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Balance Tests between Peacekeeper/Non-Peacekeeper Regions for 
2003 vs. 2013 
 
 Peacekeeper Regions 
(2003 vs. 2013) 
Non-Peacekeeper Regions 
(2003 vs. 2013) 
   
Serbs 0.01 0.01 
Croats 0.13* 0.01 
Bosniaks 0.14** 0.02 
Female 0.09 0.08 
Unemployed 0.01 0.07 
Age 0.07 0.08 
Education 0.08 0.04 
Rural 0.02 0.24** 
Survey Responses 680 449 
Two sample tests for equality of distribution functions. K-S Combined D statistic reported. 
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Table 2. Endogeneity Analysis of Peacekeeper Deployment 
 
 (1) (2) 
 peacekeepers peacekeepers 
   
Serb -0.537*  
 (0.210)  
Croat -0.478*  
 (0.210)  
Rural region -0.536**  
 (0.0818)  
Ethnically mixed2  0.585** 
municipality  (0.224) 
Log(war deaths)  1.706** 
  (0.202) 
Constant 1.908** -12.18** 
 (0.200) (1.355) 
   
Survey Responses 680 680 
Pseudo-R2 0.0728 0.327 
Dependent variable: 1 (Peacekeeper region), 0 (No Peacekeeper region) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 note: the variable “Mixed” is coded 1 if the municipality has an ethnic minority population > 
10% or 0 if <10% (mixed has a “1” if one of the ethnic groups has more than 10 percent of the 
population). Results are consistent using a more refined measure of ethnic fractionalization. 
Estimates of war casualties were obtained from the Research and Documentation Center (RDC), 
Sarajevo. See Ball et. al. (2007). 
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Table 3. Violence and Ethnic Tolerance (1989 vs. 1996) 
 
 Bosniaks/ 
Muslims 
Bosnian  
Croats 
Bosnian  
Serbs 
 1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996 
People can feel safe only when they are the majority nationality 
in their country (%) 
Agree 11 55 17 93 13 96 
Disagree 82 39 76 7 81 3 
Every nation should have its own state (%) 
Agree 6 17 14 88 5 98 
Disagree 88 80 80 11 88 1 
Nationally mixed marriages are unstable/generally not a good 
thing (%) 
Agree 25 54 29 81 23 65 
Disagree 69 31 61 17 70 32 
Source:Consortium for Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia survey, 1989; 
USIA Office of Opinion Research survey, August 1996 
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NATO Peacekeeper Deployments in Bosnia 
 
 Figure 1 below provides a map of IFOR/SFOR peacekeeper deployments circa May 1997. 
In some cases, minor deployment areas were temporary or primarily served for logistical and 
supply needs for larger field operations. For example, some of the smaller battalion-level 
peacekeeping missions were withdrawn early, such as the Russian peacekeeping mission in 
MND(N) at Camp Ugljevik. We consider her how sensitive our results are with regards to minor 
coding changes in our peacekeeping variable. Our main results are robust to a number of different 
coding strategies to include the inclusion and exclusion of minor regional peacekeeping operations.  
Figure 1. SFOR Troop Deployments in Bosnia (circa May 1997). 
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Figures 2-4. Views of NATO over time by Ethnicity 
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Figure 2. Bosnian Serb views of NATO (1995-2011)
Q: Please tell me whether you are confident/favorable or not confident/not favorable 
toward NATO? (% Bosnian Serbs)
Favorable
Unfavorable
Source: Office of Research surveys, 1995-2011
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Figure 3. Bosniaks views of NATO (1995-2011)
Q: Please tell me whether you are confident/favorable or not confident/not favorable 
toward NATO? (% Bosniaks)
Favorable
Unfavorable
Source: Office of Research surveys, 1995-2011
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Figure 4. Bosnian Croat views of NATO (1995-2011)
Q: Please tell me whether you are confident/favorable or not confident/not favorable 
toward NATO? (% Bosnian Croats)
Favorable
Unfavorable
Source: Office of Research surveys, 1995-2011
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Survey Data on Ethnic Tolerance in Bosnia (1995-2011) 
Figure 5. Bosnian Serbs Views of Bosniaks (1995-2011) 
 
Figure 6. Bosnian Serb Views of Bosnian Croats (1995-2011) 
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Figure 7. Bosnian Croat Views of Bosniaks (1995-2011) 
 
 
Figure 8. Bosnian Croat Views of Bosnian Serbs (1995-2011) 
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Figure 9. Bosniak Views of Bosnian Serbs (1995-2011) 
 
Figure 10. Bosniak Views of Bosnian Croats (1995-2011) 
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Table 4. Ethnocentrism by Ethnicity and Peacekeeper Region (Dec. 1995) 
 
 Bosniaks  Croats Serbs 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 Views of  
In-group 
Views of  
Out-groups 
Views of  
In-group 
Views of  
Out-groups 
Views of  
In-group 
Views of  
Out-groups 
       
peacekeepers -0.0648 0.0776 -0.204 -0.460 -0.339 0.279 
 (0.0694) (0.0458) (0.0901) (0.226) (0.222) (0.0670) 
female 0.0763 -0.0231 -0.100 -0.0631 -0.0586 -0.0620 
 (0.0455) (0.0635) (0.0619) (0.0474) (0.0302) (0.0901) 
age 0.000196 0.00112 0.000720 -0.00472 -0.00944 0.00360* 
 (0.00144) (0.00239) (0.00485) (0.00337) (0.00633) (0.00103) 
education -0.0741* -0.0705** 0.0125 -0.0777 -0.0337 0.0135 
 (0.0197) (0.0170) (0.0383) (0.0557) (0.0244) (0.0167) 
refugee -0.107 -0.162* 0.0493 0.0398 -0.117 0.130 
 (0.0566) (0.0600) (0.215) (0.0954) (0.105) (0.0539) 
alphaviolence 0.0505 -0.0987 0.238 0.0935 -0.670 0.0949 
 (0.203) (0.0940) (0.139) (0.168) (0.191) (0.0863) 
Constant 3.987** 2.410** 3.525** 2.823** 4.645** 0.967* 
 (0.0962) (0.162) (0.259) (0.410) (0.185) (0.200) 
       
Observations 629 629 249 249 297 299 
R-squared 0.035 0.030 0.047 0.181 0.122 0.095 
adj. r2 0.0261 0.0206 0.0236 0.160 0.104 0.0764 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by location 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
NOTE: Views of In and Out-Groups – “Please tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, 
or very unfavorable opinion of: [Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs]” 1 = very unfavorable to 4 = very favorable. Responses are 
combined into an additive index for views of out-groups for each ethnic group. Education – 1(no formal education) – 6(advanced, post-
secondary). Reported victimization – index of victimization based on self-reported personal injury, injury/death of family members, 
destruction of personal property, and having fought or family members fighting in the war.   
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Table 5. Views of NATO Peacekeeping by Ethnicity (Dec. 1995) 
 
 (1) (2) (1) 
VARIABLES Bosniak 
support for 
NATO 
Bos. Croat 
support for 
NATO 
Bos. Serb  
support for 
NATO 
    
peacekeepers 0.382** -0.0587 -0.250 
 (0.0433) (0.293) (0.0834) 
female -0.0644 0.268* -0.186 
 (0.0406) (0.0820) (0.140) 
age 0.00316 0.00962* -0.00174 
 (0.00361) (0.00332) (0.0102) 
education 0.0681** -0.0252 0.0519 
 (0.00672) (0.0315) (0.0455) 
refugee 0.0677 -0.218** -0.199* 
 (0.0665) (0.0478) (0.0399) 
alphaviolence -0.234 0.273 0.208 
 (0.124) (0.265) (0.122) 
Constant 2.978** 2.759** 1.970 
 (0.160) (0.299) (0.551) 
    
Observations 632 256 300 
R-squared 0.081 0.044 0.063 
adj. r2 0.0720 0.0212 0.0434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Compatibility of Survey and Experimental Measures of Ethnocentrism. 
 
If the UNDP social and political inclusion data, the 1995 USG favorability data, and our own 
experimental data are measuring a latent ethnocentrism, then we should expect in-group vs. out-
group variation in responses to follow similar patterns. The table below shows t-tests for in-group 
vs. out-group responses to the UNDP and USG survey questions and our experimental behavioral 
games.  The t-tests compare the mean response of in-group members to out-group members. The 
table shows that all survey and experimental instruments capture similar effects of in-group bias 
in the data. Subjects generally prefer political and social inclusion of their in-group over out-
groups, have more favorable views of in-group members, and are more biased in dictator 
allocations to in-group members over out-groups. This strengthens the argument that the survey 
and experimental instruments are capturing an underlying sentiment of ethnocentrism. 
A second point is whether the survey and experiment results show similar trends over time. 
Survey data from the USIA/US government studies suggest that favorability views of out-groups 
have improved over time, but our experimental data show that in-group biases have become worse 
over time. The surveys and experiments use comparable sampling methods to obtain subjects, even 
employing the same firm to conduct subject recruitment in some cases. We would argue that the 
experimental behavioral measures are more convincing, given that responses to survey questions 
are non-costly. Subjects can posture about their views of other groups, and the surveys may be 
capturing important changes in social norms, such that it is becoming less acceptable in Bosnian 
society to openly claim to have negative views of out-groups in survey interviews. However, the 
experiments show that when subjects can make decisions with real costs (how to allocate money 
between themselves and someone else), they still opt to give more to in-groups over out-group 
14 
 
members, and this persists over time. This is partly why we think the behavioral/experimental 
component of the study is important. The survey results give a more optimistic picture of ethnic 
divisions in Bosnian society than are perhaps warranted. We think the experiments provide an 
important caveat to what are otherwise positive trends in views toward out-groups over time.  
Another issue for cross-time comparison involves changes in the ethnic composition of the 
Bosnian population over time. US gov./UNDP surveys stratified sampling by ethnicity, focusing 
on ethnic majority areas either at the municipal and often at the neighborhood level. It is also true 
that Bosnia became much less ethnically diverse at the municipal and neighborhood level after the 
war due to ethnic cleansing and self-selection of groups into more homogenous communities. We 
attempt to control for the effects of ethnic migration and other population dynamics by comparing 
the 1991 and 2013 census results. Peacekeeper effects hold when controlling for changes in ethnic 
composition (See SI Tables 9, 11). We hope that this reduces concerns about our results being 
driven by sampling effects. If the concern is that homogenous regions were oversampled, our 
results hold when we include controls for changes in ethnic composition and for our ethnically 
mixed regions variable, which tries to capture the presence of a politically relevant minority 
population (greater than 10%) within a municipality. Such minorities were more common before 
1991 than after the war. 
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Table 6. In-group Bias using Alternate Measures of Ethnocentrism 
 
Data  
Source 
 In-
group 
Mean 
(SD) 
Out-
group 
Mean 
(SD) 
T-test 
In-
group > 
out-
group 
 In-
group 
Mean 
(SD) 
Out-
group 
Mean 
(SD) 
T-test 
In-
group > 
out-
group 
UNDP 
 
Same State 
Bosniaks 
3.96 
(0.26) 
3.17 
(0.98) 
77.89** Same 
Neighborhood 
Bosniaks 
3.96 
(0.25) 
3.15 
(0.98) 
80.17** 
UNDP 
 
Same State 
Croats 
3.96 
(0.25) 
3.56 
(0.79) 
36.42** Same 
Neighborhood 
Croats 
3.96 
(0.24) 
3.55 
(0.79) 
37.02** 
UNDP Same State 
Serbs 
3.91 
(0.33) 
3.57 
(0.81) 
34.05** Same 
neighborhood 
Serbs 
3.89 
(0.39) 
3.53 
(0.84) 
34.03** 
         
US 
gov. 
Favorability 
Bosniaks 
3.71 
(0.54) 
2.08 
(1.09) 
35.19** Exp. Dictator 
Giving to 
Bosniaks 
4.66 
(3.09) 
3.37 
(2.86) 
11.97** 
US 
gov. 
Favorability 
Croats 
3.50 
(0.61) 
2.46 
(0.94) 
17.16** Exp. Dictator 
Giving to 
Croats 
4.19 
(3.36) 
2.65 
(2.72) 
9.95** 
US 
gov. 
Favorability 
Serbs 
3.46 
(0.87) 
1.74 
(0.93) 
28.64** Exp. Dictator 
Giving to 
Serbs 
3.50 
(2.73) 
2.56 
(2.42) 
8.84** 
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Table 7. Effects of Peacekeepers/Time on Ethnocentrism by Ethnicity (Logit 
Regression) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Serb  
Subjects 
Croat  
Subjects 
Bosniak 
Subjects 
    
Peacekeeper region -0.802* -13.45** -0.633** 
 (0.319) (1.181) (0.174) 
Year 2013 0.699** 1.568** 0.0755 
 (0.197) (0.264) (0.189) 
Year2013* 
Peacekeepers Regions 
-0.0780 
(0.334) 
-0.185 
(0.440) 
-0.0391 
(0.201) 
    
Female 0.244 -0.0862 0.226 
 (0.198) (0.307) (0.295) 
Age -0.0114* -0.00130 0.0210** 
 (0.00499) (0.00812) (0.00699) 
Education 0.292 0.178 -0.253** 
 (0.316) (0.184) (0.0834) 
Rural region 0.242* 0.0145 -0.160 
 (0.0987) (0.0667) (0.116) 
Unemployed -1.015** -0.145 -0.0809 
 (0.293) (0.234) (0.351) 
Ethnically mixed 
region 
-0.122 
(0.329) 
13.13** 
(1.173) 
2.006** 
(0.126) 
    
Log(wardeaths) 0.172 -0.0606 0.229** 
 (0.146) (0.164) (0.0328) 
Constant -2.116 -0.526 -3.348** 
 (1.924) (0.459) (0.758) 
    
Survey Responses 366 323 430 
Pseudo-R2 0.0865 0.124 0.0486 
Log likelihood -229.1 -195.9 -282.3 
Dependent variable: 1 (Exhibiting in-group bias), 0 (Not exhibiting in-group bias) 
Robust standard errors clustered by location in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 8. Effects of Peacekeepers on Ethnocentrism by Rural and Ethnically 
Homogenous Locations (Logit Regression) 
 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Rural  
Regions 
2003 
Rural  
Regions 
2013 
Ethnic 
Enclaves 
2003 
Ethnic 
Enclaves 
2013 
    
Peacekeeper region -1.196** -0.851** -0.700* -0.848** 
 (0.323) (0.216) (0.302) (0.164) 
     
Bosnjak 0.533 -0.661 -1.119**  
 (0.418) (0.374) (0.266)  
Croat 0.603 -0.399 0.508 0.984** 
 (0.373) (0.393) (0.615) (0.273) 
Female 0.159 0.252 0.155 -0.499 
 (0.356) (0.464) (0.391) (0.449) 
Age -0.00269 0.00448 -0.00247 -0.0208 
 (0.0109) (0.0180) (0.00753) (0.0287) 
Education 0.00381 0.0381 0.197 0.0761 
 (0.191) (0.224) (0.233) (0.295) 
Rural Region 0.158 0.0147 0.246** 0.207 
 (0.202) (0.198) (0.0890) (0.150) 
Employed 1.211* -0.184 0.931 -1.248* 
 (0.584) (0.615) (0.646) (0.526) 
Student 1.333** 0.453 1.112 -1.028 
 (0.502) (0.650) (0.602) (0.941) 
Unemployed 0.272 -0.782 -0.00289 -1.319** 
 (0.678) (0.469) (0.642) (0.431) 
Ethnically mixed region -0.692 0.401 - - 
 (0.495) (0.240)   
Log(war deaths) 0.510** -0.334** 0.372* 0.0941 
 (0.190) (0.104) (0.187) (0.0863) 
Constant -4.665 3.145 -4.479 1.203 
 (2.464) (1.606) (2.576) (2.378) 
Restriction Rural Only Rural Only Enclaves Enclaves 
Observations 264 146 262 210 
Dependent variable: 1 (Exhibiting in-group bias), 0 (Not exhibiting in-group bias) 
Robust standard errors clustered by location in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 9. Effects of Peacekeepers on Ethnocentrism, Controlling for Politically Relevant Groups 
and Ethnic Fractionalization (1991 census vs. 2013 census) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ingroupbias ingroupbias 
   
Year 2013 0.470* 0.472* 
 (0.233) (0.238) 
Peacekeeper regions -0.608** -0.525** 
 (0.216) (0.196) 
Year 2013*Peacekeeper regions -0.158 -0.213 
 (0.265) (0.266) 
Feeling close to one’s ethnicty 0.550** 0.561** 
 (0.0882) (0.0879) 
Feeling unsafe around other  0.172 0.171 
ethnicities (0.0920) (0.0979) 
Trust in NATO -0.0688 -0.0572 
 (0.0546) (0.0512) 
Bosnjak 0.404 0.433* 
 (0.323) (0.219) 
Croat 0.237 0.154 
 (0.163) (0.162) 
Female 0.195 0.193 
 (0.126) (0.118) 
Age 0.00502 0.00535 
 (0.00564) (0.00581) 
Education 0.0590 0.0652 
 (0.0987) (0.0978) 
Rural region -0.0376 -0.0263 
 (0.0875) (0.0897) 
Employed 0.0524 0.0576 
 (0.158) (0.152) 
Student 0.212 0.242 
 (0.192) (0.195) 
Unemployed -0.304* -0.304* 
 (0.150) (0.149) 
Ethfrac91  -0.122 
  (0.611) 
Ethfrac13  0.972 
  (0.541) 
Ethnically mixed region 0.0846  
 (0.249)  
Log(wardeaths) -0.0214 -0.0641 
 (0.0463) (0.0578) 
Constant -1.689** -1.728** 
 (0.622) (0.558) 
   
19 
 
Observations 1,046 1,046 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 10. Logit Regression on In-group Bias using Coarsened Exact Matching on Covariate 
Imbalances between Peacekeeper and non-Peacekeeper Regions3 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES ingroupbias 
  
Year 2013 0.500* 
 (0.272) 
Peacekeeper regions -0.695** 
 (0.228) 
Year 2013*Peacekeeper regions 0.0680 
 (0.316) 
Bosnjak 0.337 
 (0.344) 
Croat 0.275 
 (0.182) 
Female 0.233 
 (0.138) 
Age 0.00820 
 (0.00628) 
Education -0.0577 
 (0.126) 
Rural region 0.000703 
 (0.0918) 
Employed 0.161 
 (0.166) 
Student 0.249 
 (0.185) 
Unemployed -0.162 
 (0.128) 
Ethnically mixed region -0.187 
 (0.308) 
Log(wardeaths) 0.0540 
 (0.0549) 
Constant -0.784 
                                                          
3 See SI Table 1B for imbalances on Bosniaks, Croats, and Urban/Rural subjects. On CEM 
matching, see Iacus, Stefano M., Gary King, Giuseppe Porro, and Jonathan N. Katz. 2012. 
"Causal inference without balance checking: Coarsened exact matching." Political Analysis 
20(1): 1-24.).  
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 (0.594) 
  
Observations 1,119 
adj.r2 0.0429 
ll -738.7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Omitted Variable Bias. International aid could be an important omitted variable. If aid follows 
peacekeepers, it could serve as a potential confounder of the peacekeeping effect. We do not have 
a clear picture of levels and changes in international development aid at the municipal level in 
Bosnia (statistical agencies in Bosnia do not collect such information), but we could potentially 
look at changes in economic development as one proxy for the effect of international aid, where 
more aid leads to tangible changes in economic well-being on the ground. In the regression models 
below, we consider 2 individual level and 3 municipal level variables that account for changes in 
economic development. The dependent variable is experimental in-group bias. The individual level 
measure (past income) ask subjects to assess whether their income over the past 12 months has 
become a great deal worse, stayed the same, or become a great deal better.  The individual level 
measure (future income) deals with the expectation that future income will become worse or better. 
We also include 3 municipal level measures of economic development based on data from the 
Statistical Agency of Bosnia-Herzegovina (compiled by Analitika – Center for Social Research 
Sarajevo http://www.mojemjesto.ba/en/content/about-my-place-project). Change in Net Wages 
represents the % change in municipal level wages between years 2005 and 2013. Unemployment 
changes represent the % change in municipal level unemployment between years 2005 and 2013, 
and GDP per capita change is the % change in the GDP per capita between 2007 and 2013 by the 
municipality as estimated by Bosnia’s Federal Development Planning Institution. 2005 and 2007 
were the earliest dates provided for municipal level economic data. Model 1 uses Logit regression 
21 
 
with clustered standard errors by location. Model 2 employs Logit regression with municipal 
random effects. Both models show robust peacekeeper effects when controlling for these potential 
confounders. We note in the manuscript now that while we are unable to control for international 
aid (a potential confounder), our results are robust to changes in municipal level development 
which might accompany aid flows. 
Table 11. Peacekeeper Effects when Controlling for Changes in Municipal Level Economic 
Development 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ingroupbias ingroupbias 
   
Year 2013 0.652** 0.652** 
 (0.243) (0.235) 
Peacekeeper regions -0.550** -0.550* 
 (0.213) (0.257) 
Year 2013*Peacekeeper regions -0.208 -0.208 
 (0.264) (0.298) 
Feeling close to one’s ethnicity 0.520** 0.520** 
 (0.0965) (0.104) 
Feeling unsafe around other  0.184* 0.184 
ethnicities (0.0736) (0.0939) 
Trust in NATO -0.0841 -0.0841 
 (0.0521) (0.0833) 
Bosnjak 0.430 0.430 
 (0.426) (0.336) 
Croat 0.203 0.203 
 (0.367) (0.370) 
Female 0.149 0.149 
 (0.115) (0.147) 
Age 0.00816 0.00816 
 (0.00555) (0.00551) 
Education 0.131 0.131 
 (0.0987) (0.0995) 
Rural region -0.0454 -0.0454 
 (0.106) (0.0805) 
Employed -0.136 -0.136 
 (0.212) (0.240) 
Student 0.205 0.205 
 (0.244) (0.267) 
Unemployed -0.362* -0.362 
 (0.182) (0.243) 
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Ethfrac91 0.218 0.218 
 (0.412) (0.330) 
Ethfrac13 -0.102 -0.102 
 (0.870) (1.112) 
Ethnically mixed region 0.821 0.821 
 (0.683) (0.782) 
Futureincome -0.0809 -0.0809 
 (0.0796) (0.0760) 
Pastincome -0.0234 -0.0234 
 (0.0821) (0.0855) 
Change in Net Wages 2005-2013 0.00456 0.00456 
(Municipal Level) (0.00729) (0.00688) 
Unemployment change 2005-2013 0.00224 0.00224 
(Municipal Level) (0.0147) (0.0172) 
GDP per capita change 2007-2013 -0.00254 -0.00254 
(Municipal Level) (0.00513) (0.00549) 
Log(wardeaths) -0.0936 -0.0936 
 (0.0826) (0.113) 
Constant -1.640* -1.640 
 (0.779) (1.052) 
Municipal-Level Random Effects No Yes 
Observations 947 947 
Number of locales  16 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 12. Ethnocentrism: Experimental Behavior vs. Survey Attitudes (Logit Regression) 
 (1) (2) 
 ingroupbias ingroupbias 
   
Feeling close to 
one’s ethnicity  
0.727** 
(0.0678) 
 
   
Feeling unsafe 
around other 
ethnicities  
 0.381** 
(0.0741) 
   
Female 0.126 0.0645 
 (0.123) (0.128) 
Age 0.00313 0.00514 
 (0.00462) (0.00476) 
Education 0.0158 -0.0208 
 (0.0996) (0.103) 
Rural region -0.0748 -0.0746 
 (0.0887) (0.0835) 
Unemployed -0.390** -0.364* 
 (0.142) (0.176) 
Ethnically mixed 
municipality 
0.150 0.123 
 (0.301) (0.312) 
Log(wardeaths) -0.176* -0.183* 
 (0.0841) (0.0851) 
Constant -0.263 0.260 
 (0.591) (0.575) 
   
Survey Responses 1,051 1,115 
Pseudo-R2 0.0635 0.0296 
Log likelihood -679.6 -746.4 
Dependent variable: 1 (Exhibiting in-group bias), 0 (Not exhibiting in-group bias) 
Robust standard errors clustered by location in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Alternative Specifications of the Peacekeeper Variable  
 
Table 13. Manuscript Table 1 with the addition of minor regional peacekeeping operations 
(UNDP Data 2006-2010)  
 
 Political Inclusion Social Inclusion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Share 
State 
with 
Bosniaks 
Share State 
with  
Croats 
Share 
State with 
Serbs 
Neighbors 
with 
Bosniaks 
Neighbors 
with  
Croats 
Neighbors 
with 
Serbs 
peacekeepers2 0.332** 0.351** 0.386** 0.281** 0.307** 0.370** 
 (0.114) (0.0932) (0.0850) (0.0990) (0.0887) (0.0818) 
time 0.0226 0.0465** 0.0512** 0.0152 0.0324** 0.0552** 
 (0.0134) (0.0118) (0.0197) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0194) 
Bosniak subject  2.070** 1.518**  1.991** 1.546** 
  (0.128) (0.108)  (0.133) (0.103) 
Croat subject 0.184   0.0449   
 (0.103)   (0.0848)   
female 0.0930* 0.0197 0.0135 0.0851* -0.00172 0.0127 
 (0.0419) (0.0663) (0.0580) (0.0366) (0.0722) (0.0610) 
age 0.00269 0.00418** 0.00177 0.00404 0.00460** 0.00235 
 (0.00332) (0.00131) (0.00280) (0.00354) (0.00141) (0.00267) 
education -0.166** -0.115** -0.117 -0.177** -0.125** -0.119 
 (0.0608) (0.0406) (0.0870) (0.0599) (0.0423) (0.0865) 
village -0.108* -0.232** -0.0638 -0.118* -0.281** -0.0822 
 (0.0512) (0.0566) (0.0581) (0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0643) 
       
Constant 1 -1.606** -0.978** -0.806 -1.852** -1.513** -0.592 
 (0.456) (0.332) (0.566) (0.355) (0.272) (0.563) 
Constant 2 -0.610 0.0383 0.156 -0.772* -0.458 0.468 
 (0.452) (0.340) (0.559) (0.363) (0.272) (0.582) 
Constant 3 0.743 1.555** 1.373* 0.532 1.063** 1.604** 
 (0.492) (0.334) (0.615) (0.392) (0.270) (0.621) 
Out-groups Only Croats, 
Serbs 
Only 
Serbs, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Croats, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Croats, 
Serbs Only 
Serbs, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Croats, 
Bosniaks 
Only 
Observations 11,748 16,065 15,330 11,734 16,056 15,324 
adj. r2 0.00613 0.122 0.0767 0.00520 0.114 0.0788 
ll -13976 -12100 -12094 -14226 -12279 -12576 
Robust standard errors clustered by survey wave in parentheses. 
See SI Table 15 for variable description and coding, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 14. Summary of Variables (US Government Survey, Dec. 1995) 
Views of Nato – “what is your opinion of the decision to deploy 60,000 NATO peacekeeping 
troops to Bosnia?” 1 = strongly oppose to 4 = strongly support 
Views of In and Out-Groups – “Please tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat 
favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of: [Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, 
Bosnian Serbs]” 1 = very unfavorable to 4 = very favorable. Responses are combined into an 
additive index for views of out-groups for each ethnic group. 
Peacekeepers – 1(site of future peacekeeping forces), 0(no future peacekeepers). Includes 
major peacekeeping operations (Division, multi-brigade level) comparable to both survey and 
experimental locations. Note: limited number of sampling locations for comparison.  
female – 1(women), 0(men) 
education – 1(no formal education) – 6(advanced, post-secondary)  
refugee – 1(refugee/idp), 0(not refugee/idp) 
alphaviolence – index of victimization based on self-reported personal injuries, injury/death 
of family members, destruction of personal property, and having fought or family members 
fighting in the war. 
 
 
Table 15. Summary of Variables (UNDP Data 2006-2010) 
Same State with Out-Group – How acceptable/unacceptable is it for you to live in the same 
state with [Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks]? [1 = completely unacceptable to 4 = completely acceptable]  
Neighbors with Out-group  - How acceptable/unacceptable is it for [Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks] 
to live in your neighborhood? [1 = completely unacceptable to 4 = completely acceptable] 
Peacekeepers – 1(presence of peacekeeping forces), 0(no peacekeepers). Includes major 
peacekeeping operations (Division, multi-brigade level) comparable to both survey and 
experimental locations 
Peacekeepers2– 1(presence of peacekeeping forces), 0(no peacekeepers). Includes major 
peacekeeping operations (Division, multi-brigade level) including some additional minor 
peacekeeping operations (battalion level) not included in the experimental locations. 
female – 1(women), 0(men) 
age – age in years 
education – 1(no formal education) – 4(advanced, post-secondary)  
rural – 1(rural sampling location) – 0(urban/suburban sampling location) 
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Table 16. Summary of Variables (2003, 2013 Behavioral Experiments) 
Variable Measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
 Peacekeeper Non-Peacekeeper 
 Regions Regions 
Percentage of respondents 
Ingroupbias – 1(sending more money to your own 
group), 0(not sending more money to your own group) 
38% 55% 
Year  - 1(2013), 0 =(2003) 32% 50% 
Feeling close to one’s ethnicity – How close do you feel 
to people of your ethnicity compared to others in Bosnia? 
1(no real difference), 2(somewhat closer to my ethnic 
group), 3(much closer to my ethnic group) – percentages 
represent those who feel somewhat or much closer 
53% 67% 
Feeling unsafe around other ethnicities – How safe do 
you feel in the presence of members of other ethnic 
groups in Bosnia? 1(very safe) to 4(very unsafe) – 
percentages represent those who feel somewhat or very 
unsafe. 
35% 47% 
Trust in NATO – 1(Highly distrust), 4(Highly trust). 
Percentages represent those who generally or highly trust 
NATO.   
54% 51% 
Serb – 1(Serbs), 0(other) 29% 37% 
Croat – 1(Croats), 0(other) 23% 37% 
Bosniak – 1(Bosniaks), 0(other) 47% 26% 
Female – 1(women), 0(men) 47% 42% 
Education – 1(primary) – 4(advanced, post-secondary) 
percentages represent high school graduates 
88% 82% 
Rural region – 1(urban), 4(village), Percentages 
represent those living in a small town or village 
8% 23% 
Employed  - 1(working full time), 0(other) 36% 33% 
Student – 1(student), 0(other) 26% 18% 
Unemployed – 1(unemployed), 0(other) 25% 29% 
Ethnically mixed region – 1(ethnic minority group 
population over 10 percent), 0(other) 
74% 36% 
Mean value among respondents 
War deaths – Number of war deaths by region 3,864 1,329 
Age – Respondent age in years, 18–77 in 2003, 18–82 in 
2013 
35 37 
Victimization – 2013 only. index of victimization (alpha 
= 0.70) based on self-reported exposure to violence, 
personal injury, injury or death of family members, 
injury or death of close friends, close friends and family 
still missing from the conflict. (min = 1, max  = 2.25) 
1.54 1.62 
Pastincome – survey measure of self-assessment of past 
income over the past 12 months, responses range from 1 
3.09 3.20 
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= become a great deal worse to 5 = become a great deal 
better. 
Futureincome – survey measure of self-assessment of  
income expectations over next 12 months, responses 
range from 1 = become a great deal worse to 5 = become 
a great deal better. 
2.95 3.05 
Ethfrac91 – municipal level ethnic fractionalization 
index based on 1991 census (0 = low frac to 1 = high 
frac) 
0.67 0.52 
Ethfrac13 – municipal level ethnic fractionalization 
index based on 2013 census (0 = low frac to 1 = high 
frac) 
0.37 0.34 
Change in Net Wages – municipal level % change in net 
wages between 2005 and 2013. Ranges from 21% 
increase to 100% increase 
50.3 58.9 
Unemployment change – municipal level % change in 
unemployment between 2005 and 2013. Ranges from  
-23% decrease to 7.5% increase 
-0.14 -3.88 
GDP per capita change– municipal level % change in 
GDP per capita between 2007 and 2013. Ranges from  
-19% decrease to 77.5% increase 
8.3 28.3 
Survey Responses 653 476 
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Table 17. Treatment Effect Estimation of the Effect of Peacekeepers on In-group Bias in the 
Dictator Game 
 
A. Regression Adjustment 
 
ATE Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% CI] 
Peacekeepers = 1 vs. 0 -0.18 0.04 -4.32 0.000 -0.26 -0.10 
 
B. Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment 
 
ATE Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% CI] 
Peacekeepers = 1 vs. 0 -0.24 0.04 -5.78 0.000 -0.32 -0.16 
 
C. Inverse Probability Weighting 
 
ATE Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% CI] 
Peacekeepers = 1 vs. 0 -0.20 0.03 -5.79 0.000 -0.26 -0.13 
 
D. Propensity Score Matching 
 
ATE Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% CI] 
Peacekeepers = 1 vs. 0 -0.17 0.03 -5.28 0.000 -0.23 -0.11 
 
Note: Models A-C control/adjust for covariates: year, ethnicity, gender age, education, 
urbal/rural location, unemployed, ethnically mixed regions, and war-deaths by municipality. 
Model D. adjusts for imbalances between Bosniaks, Croats, and Urban/Rural subjects between 
peacekeeper vs. non-peacekeeper regions (SI Table 1B). 
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UNPROFOR Peacekeepers in Bosnia (1992-1995) 
 
The war-time United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission that began in 1992 under 
UNSCR 1031 ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords. UNPROFOR was much 
more limited in scope and capacity than subsequent NATO peacekeeping forces. UNPROFOR’s 
mandate in Bosnia included providing aid to Sarajevo, escorting humanitarian aid convoys, 
protecting safe areas (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa). Figures 11 and 12 
indicate the location of UNPROFOR forces in 1993 and 1995 respectively. See Berkowitz 1994; 
Pushkina 2006; and Daadler 2014 for discussion of UNPROFOR’s role in Bosnia.   
 
Berkowitz, Bruce D. 1994. "Rules of engagement for UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia." Orbis 
38.4 (1994): 635-646. 
 
Daalder, Ivo H. 2014. Getting to Dayton: the making of America's Bosnia policy. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2014. 
 
Pushkina, Darya. 2006. "A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping 
mission." International Peacekeeping 13.2 (2006): 133-149. 
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Figure 11. UNPROFOR Deployments in Bosnia (circa early 1993). 
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Figure 12. UNPROFOR Deployments in Bosnia (circa October 1995). 
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Experimental Protocols for Bosnia 
BEFORE THE SESSION 
 
1. Local Administrator and Assistant rehearse the script, and prepare the session room. 
There must be sufficient space to accommodate participants and to assure that each 
participant has enough space to work in comfort and relative privacy. Portable shields 
will be placed at each designated station so that participants will not be able to see 
what others are doing once the session begins. 
2. The Administrator prepares the consent forms. 
CHECK-IN 
 
1. As participants arrive, they are greeted at the entrance to the session room. They are asked 
to show their letter of invitation [FORM “LETTER OF INVITATION”] to participate in 
the session. Because this letter will have been hand delivered by either the administrator 
him/herself or one of the other local interviewers, someone will be able to guarantee that 
the person with the letter is, in fact, the person who received the letter. The will use a 
“SCREENING SURVEY” [FORM “SCREENING SURVEY”] to verify the identity of the 
person with the letter. Once the person is properly identified, the screening survey form 
must be destroyed.  
2. The administrator will then give each respondent a consent form to read.  [FORM 
“LETTER OF CONSENT”]  The respondent may then choose to leave, indicating lack of 
consent. Respondents who stay have consented to participate by agreeing to stay.    
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3. The administrator assigns each respondent who has agreed to stay a unique ID number 
printed on an index card, and assigns them to a seat with a screening shield. The 
administrator places the index card with the ID number behind the screen and instructs 
the participant not to move the card.  
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
Welcome.  Thank you for coming today.  My name is ***.  As you know you will receive 
a payment today for your participation.  You also have the opportunity to receive additional money 
based on the tasks involved in today’s activity. 
 
Before we begin there are several rules we would like you to keep in mind: 
 
1. First, you should not talk with one another or look at anyone else’s work.  
2. Second, please listen to all instructions that I give you.  This is very important. If you 
follow the instructions carefully you might make a considerable sum of money.   
3. Third, we will be handing out many different forms to you.  Please do not begin filling 
out or looking at those forms until I ask you to do so.   
4. Fourth, you will receive a number of envelopes with money or blank sheets of paper.  
Please do not open them until I ask you to.   
5. Finally, you just received a card with an ID number on it.  Please turn it upside down.  
Do not show that number to anyone else except myself or one of my assistants. 
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Now, let me tell you a little about this research project.  This is an international social 
science research project, and the questions that you will answer and the tasks you will perform 
have been administered to participants around the world. The purpose of the project is to 
understand how people of different cultures and backgrounds make decisions, interact with other 
people, and how their decisions are affected by the conditions in their local environment. We are 
going to ask you to make decisions about money.  These decisions will involve not only you and 
but also other people from Bosnia.   
I am conducting this research project on behalf of the research institute, Mareco Index 
Bosnia. Mareco Index Bosnia is the leading institute for survey research in our country and has 
participated in many international and domestic research projects. In this project, I will serve not 
only as the administrator of this session, but also as your local contact, in case you ever have 
questions about the progress of the study or your involvement. Standing over there is “***”. He/she 
is our assistant for this project. He/she will serve as my assistant and will pass out the forms and 
materials that you will use. 
 
You will participate in two main types of tasks today.  You will receive different forms for 
each task.  The first task will be to complete a relatively short survey, which uses questions from 
general international social surveys on public opinion, attitudes, and basic social data. Rest assured 
that we will not ask you to provide any information that could be used to identify you as a 
participant in this study. In the second task, you will be asked to make several decisions about how 
to allocate money.  In each of these tasks, you will have to decide how to allocate a sum of money, 
which we will provide, between yourself and someone else. The other person that you will be 
working with will not be in this room, but they will be a future participant in this study, and they 
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will be from Bosnia. In these decision-making exercises, the money you allocate to yourself will 
be yours to keep. Any money that you choose to send to the other person will be placed in an 
envelope, sealed, and given to them at a future session like this. Today you will also be given 
envelopes which were sent from other persons in Bosnia. Although they did not know who you 
were, we provided them with some basic information to inform their decision. At several points 
we will ask you to predict what you think how much money these other persons might have given 
to you.  You will not know what that other person has decided.  We would like your best guess.  
This is not a test. We only want to know your opinion.   
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
<If there are questions, refer to the sheet.  Most questions will be answered by stating that full 
instructions will be given later.> 
 
Short Survey 
 
First we would like you to answer a few questions about your background.  The assistant 
will come around to each of you and hand you a survey booklet and a pen.  The first thing you will 
need to do is to copy the ID number on the card you were given to the upper right corner of the 
front of the survey booklet.  Do not open the booklet until I instruct you to do so. We will go 
through each question together as a group. I will read each question aloud and you will circle the 
appropriate answer. Please circle only one answer to each question. You may refuse to answer a 
question if you choose. You may also choose to answer “Don’t Know” on many questions. 
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However, we would wish that you provide us with honest and thoughtful answers to every 
question. If you refuse to answer questions, or simply circle “don’t know” every time, then it 
doesn’t tell us very much about how you think and it will hurt the overall quality of our project. 
Please do not read ahead. Answer only the question that I am reading to you, and be patient if 
others take more time. If you have questions, please raise your hand, and I will come to you. Please 
do not say your answers to questions aloud, because it will influence what others think. And you 
may disagree about the answers to some of the questions. When everyone is finished, the assistant 
will collect the survey booklets and we will begin the decision-making tasks.    
 
<Assistant hands out the survey booklet [FORM BASIC QUESTIONAIRE].  The Administrator 
will then read each question and answer aloud as the participants fill out the form. The first 
question, about SEX/GENDER will serve as a simple example question to familiarize participants 
with the format of the survey. Once filled out, the assistant collects each one and checks to make 
certain that the Respondent’s ID number is correctly written on the cover page of the survey 
booklet.  If not, he will point it out to them and make them enter it properly.  Items are stored in a 
manila envelope as they are collected.  The envelope is marked “BASIC QUESTIONNAIRE,” and 
has the date and a session number written on it.> 
 
Decision Exercises 
Decision Exercise (In-Group Recipient)_ 
 
We are now ready to begin the decision-making tasks. Your first task is to decide how to 
allocate a sum of money between yourself and someone else in Bosnia.  That person is not 
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physically present in this room today, but they will be participating in a future session. The 
Assistant is now going to pass out to each of you 2 envelopes and 10 banknotes, and 10 blank 
strips of paper of equal size.  You will be deciding how to allocate the money and the slips of paper 
between yourself and another person. To ensure your privacy, we have provided you with a screen 
on the table and that is a place in which you can do your work.  Remember, please keep your 
decisions private.   
 
The Assistant gives each respondent an envelope marked “KEEP,” an envelope marked  “SEND,” 
10 banknotes, and 10 blank pieces of paper.> The “SEND” Envelope will be labeled with the 
ethnicity of the recipient.  
 
You will see that there are two envelopes.  One is labeled “keep” and the other is labeled 
“send.”  I want you to put 10 notes and/or slips of paper in the envelope labeled “keep” and the 
remaining 10 in the envelope labeled “send.”  You will keep whatever you put in the “keep” 
envelope.  Whatever is placed in the “send” envelope will be given to another person living in 
Bosnia.  You may allocate the money and slips of paper in any way that you please.  Please take a 
look at your materials. 
 
<pause for a little bit> 
 
Let me give you some examples.  Remember, you can do whatever you wish.  For example, 
you could put 10 BANKNOTES and 0 blank slips of paper in your “keep” envelope.  In the “send” 
envelope you would then put 0 BANKNOTES and 10 blank slips of blank paper.  Or you could 
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decide to put 7 BANKNOTES in your “keep” envelope, with 3 blank slips of paper.  You would 
then put 3 BANKNOTES in the “send” envelope, with 7 blank slips of paper. (Repeat for other 
examples).  You can do anything you wish.  Just remember that each envelope must have 10 things 
in it.  It may have any combination of bills and paper slips.  Also keep in mind that whatever you 
put in the “send” envelope will be given to someone else in Bosnia 
 
The first thing I want you to do is to write you ID number in the upper right corner of the 
“send” envelope.  Please decide how to allocate the money.  When you are done, seal the “send” 
envelope and the Assistant will come around and pick it up.  You may put the “keep” envelope 
beside you on the table.  It is yours to keep.  Please begin.  If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and I will try to answer your question in private. Remember, you are not permitted to 
talk to one another in this room, because we do not want you to influence each other’s decisions. 
Each person must make their own decision about what to do with the money and slips of paper.  
 
<Wait until everyone is finished.  The Assistant picks up the “SEND” envelope from each 
respondent.  While doing so, the Assistant makes certain the subject’s ID is in the upper right 
corner of the envelope.  If not, have them do so properly.  Once all of the envelopes have been 
picked up, they should be put into an envelope, labeled Decision1 along with the group number 
and date.> 
 
Decision Exercise (Out-group Recipient) 
 
39 
 
You will again receive two envelopes, 10 BANKNOTES and 10 blank slips of paper.  As 
in the first task, you will have to decide how to allocate the banknotes and slips of paper between 
yourself and someone else. It will be your task to decide how to distribute the money and paper 
between yourself and the other person.  That person is not physically present in this room today, 
but they will be participating in a future session. 
 
<The Assistant hands each respondent one “Keep” envelope and one “Send” envelope, 10 
BANKNOTES, and 10 blank slips of paper. Each “SEND” envelope will have a label indicating 
the ethnicity of the recipient (Serb, Croat, or Bosniak). Each participant will be given an envelope 
of a person with a different ethnicity than their own. Which of the remaining ethnicities they receive 
will be randomly determined.> 
 
First, please write your ID number in the upper right corner of the “Send” envelope.  Now, 
please be sure to read the label printed on the “Send” envelope. The label tells you more about the 
person to whom you are sending this envelope. Please make your decision. Remember to put 10 
items in each envelope. You may put in any combination of money and blank slips of paper in 
each one. (Use examples) The “send” envelope will be given to another person in a different region 
in a future session.  The “keep” envelope is yours to keep.  When you are done, the “send” 
envelopes will be collected.  
 
<When everyone is finished, the Assistant picks up the “SEND” envelope. While doing so, the 
Assistant makes certain that the subject’s ID in the upper right corner of the envelope is correct.  
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Once all of the envelopes have been picked up, they should be put in a folder labeled D-3 with 
group number and date on it.> 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This concludes our session. I want to thank everyone for your participation.  The tasks that 
you engaged in here are valuable for our research.   You are now free to leave.  Please take all of 
the envelopes that have money in them and you can keep the pen that you were given.  You can 
open the envelopes once you leave.  Please open them in private.  Please leave all of the other 
materials here. We thank you for participating in our study, and please feel free to contact us in 
the future if you have any questions. Our contact information is provided on your letter of 
invitation to the session. However, please feel free to stay if you have any further questions. Thank 
you again and have a good day. 
